HABEO AND *AVEO*: THE ROMANCE FUTURE

I

'THE sudden emergence of all the post-classical functions of *habeo*+Infinitive in Tertullian is very remarkable', as Mr. Coleman has said in his important paper[1] (p. 226) on the origin and development of this structure, so prominent in the formation of the Future and Conditional paradigms of the main Romance languages. The functions which he has in mind are all Prospective: he distinguishes meanings tangential, as he puts it, to Possibility, Obligation/Necessity, Futurity, and, for the past tenses of *habeo*, Futurity-in-the-Past and Conditioned Unreality (p. 217). In this he essentially follows received opinion,[2] though there have been those who would also distinguish a meaning tangential to Volition.[3] Mr. Coleman gives these short shrift (p. 217 n. 3, p. 219 n. 2). Whether rightly, the reader may judge from what follows.

Precisely because the semantic developments observed in Tertullian (*ob.* 220) and his contemporaries are so striking and so crucial, and since these must be explained in terms of what went before, we should examine previous usage as closely as possible. For if the evidence is misrepresented as to substance or mis-related as to interpretation and category, it follows that any explanation of the origin of the future sense of *habeo*+infinitive can only be partly or accidentally right. The purpose of this paper is to show that one third of the relevant evidence has not been called, and that Thielmann and others are wrong in any case in deriving the future sense of *habeo*+inf. exclusively from what I shall for brevity's sake call the 'must'-*habeo*. Let us begin by tracing the earliest use of *habeo*+infinitive.

II

The structure first appears in Cicero in contexts where *habeo* means 'can'.[4] An important restriction, neglected since Thielmann first observed it, is that the

[1] 'The Origin and Development of Latin *habeo*+Infinitive', *C.Q.* lxv (1971), 215–31. I assume that the reader has access to this article, and shall make fewer references to the doxography than would otherwise be appropriate: Mr. Coleman has provided an excellent bibliography (pp. 230 f.).

[2] All modern discussions are deeply in debt to P. Thielmann's work ('*Habere* mit dem Infinitiv und die Entstehung des romanischen Futurums', *A.L.L.* ii [1885], 48–89 and 157–202). He collected more evidence than anyone else had before, and made some important observations which have subsequently been neglected, while presenting the evidence in such a rigidly diachronic manner—this was before de Saussure's time—as to perpetuate in subsequent discussion and in text-books certain false categories and lines of semantic derivation: see below, p. 396.

[3] So e.g. A. H. Salonius, *Vitae Patrum*, 1920, 284 (not well argued) and, more influentially, V. Bulhart in his *T.L.L.* article on *habeo* as a sub-section of 'futurity' (2457. 67–2458. 12).

[4] *Rosc.* 100 'habeo etiam dicere quem . . . de ponte . . . deiecerit'; *Acad.* 2. 43 'quid dicere habeant cur illa definitio uera sit?'; *N.D.* 1. 63 'de diuis neque ut sint neque ut non sint non habeo dicere' (translating Protagoras' famous remark . . . οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι; but that is irrelevant to the acceptability of the Latin locution) ; *Balb.* 33 'quid habes igitur dicere de Gaditano foedere eiusmodi?'; *de or.* 10 'quid habes igitur de causa dicere?'; ibid. 27 'quid habes de orationis praeceptis dicere?'; *Div.* 2. 136 'de nostris somniis quid habemus dicere?'; *N.D.* 3. 93 'haec fere dicere habui de natura deorum.'

infinitive must belong to the semantic class 'inform'. In his formal writings, Cicero restricts himself to *dicere*; in his letters, as we might expect, there is more variety, but not much.[1] This remains the dominant use of the locution right up to Tertullian's time,[2] though it should be noted that at the time of Christ it seems that the intellectual idea 'inform' was expanded to include the emotional idea 'express one's feelings verbally'.[3] From the same period, and more significantly, we find one species of the locution freed of the semantic restriction on the type of infinitive completely:

> Aug. ap. Suet. *Aug.* 58. 2 (2 B.C.) 'compos factus uotorum meorum, p.c., quid habeo aliud deos immortales precari quam ut . . .?' (for Suetonius' remarks on Augustus' idiosyncrasies of speech and writing, see ibid. 87).
> Cestius ap. Sen. Rh. *Contr.* 1. 1. 19 'quid habui facere? perducere illum ad patrem? non feci.'
> Ovid *Met.* 9. 658 'quid enim dare maius habebant?'

These are doubly defined as a group: *habeo*-expressions from the Augustan Age which do not obey the semantic restriction on the type of infinitive turn out to be rhetorical questions in which earlier writers would have used the subjunctive (*precer, facerem, darent*) and which represent an extension of the species 'de nostris somniis quid habemus dicere?' (Cic. *Div.* 2. 136). We may also observe here the earliest examples of the semantic development which results in Tertullian in the use of *habeo*+inf. as an exponent of obligation and necessity. We must be careful here to remember that meaning is not inherent in the morphemes and lexemes of a language, but is a function of the ways in which they are used. It is clear that, while all three examples are essentially parallel in their use of the structure *habeo*+inf., the Ovid example differs from the other two in that it is purely potential ('what greater thing could they give?'), whereas the others are ambiguous between potentiality and obligation ('what can I ask the immortal gods, other than that . . .?'; 'what could I do?'). I have used the main English exponent of potentiality to translate all three cases: but it would be wrong to argue that therefore the latter pair are purely potential and not at all obligative either in English or Latin.[4] What then makes the difference? Not the person of the verb, for 'quid maius habui facere?' would be purely potential, and 'quid aliud dare habebant?' would be ambiguous between potentiality and obligation. These inversions give the answer: when the speaker is concerned with alternatives which differ in degree, not kind ('quid maius?'), the *habeo* remains purely potential; but when he is concerned with

[1] *Att.* 2. 22. 6 'de re publica nihil habeo ad te scribere'; *fam.* 1. 5a. 3 'de Alexandrina re . . . tantum habeo polliceri me tibi . . . satis facturum.'
[2] (a) with *dicere*: Lucr. 6. 711 (after an explanation) 'item in multis hoc rebus dicere habemus'; Colum. *Arb.* 5. 8 'sed haec . . . de toto genere huius arboris habui dicere; nunc . . .'; Gellius *N.A.* 14. 1. 2 'utrum . . . an . . . , non habeo dicere'; ibid. 17. 20. 5 'habesne nobis dicere . . . tam apte . . . compositam orationem?' Then in Tertullian and his contemporaries and throughout subsequent Latin, e.g. *test. anim.* 6. (b) with other 'inform' locutions: Hor. *Epod.* 16. 23

'sic placet? an melius quis habet suadere?' (cf. E. Fraenkel, *Horace*, 1957, 44 f.); Ovid *Tr.* 1. 1. 123 'plura quidem mandare tibi, si quaeris, habebam'; Quint. *Decl.* 7. 12 'habeo adhuc ex illo multa referre secreto'; Apul. *Fl.* 6 'qui nihil habet adferre cur prandeat'. This use too continues in and after Tertullian.

[3] Ovid *ex P.* 3. 182 'nec te si cupiat laedere rumor habet' (i.e., neque quisquam tibi male dicere habet); [Quint.] *Decl.* 16. 5 'sic habeo queri, quasi relinquar.'

[4] The latter pair would only be purely potential if they exhibited the tonic forms: 'what *can* I do . . . ?', 'What *could* I do?'.

alternatives which differ in kind (*quid aliud?*; *quid habui facere?*+one or more items different from what he actually did) he causes *habeo* to function in a new way. The components of the relevant species of 'obligation' may be described thus. The speaker (i) allows the agent (who may or may not be himself) at least two lines of action which differ in kind, (ii) regarding the agent as capable of both, but (iii) prescribing one as the right line to follow.[1] What we see in these examples is not primarily the establishment of a 'must'-*habeo* but first the use of *habeo*+inf. for the independent subjunctive in questions in contexts of ability and then its extension by analogy to contexts of deliberation, where there is no valid distinction between potentiality and obligation, and to contexts where an idea of obligation is made explicit. But whether this was the only, or even a prominent growth point for the 'must'-*habeo*, I do not think we can say.

For it is strikingly difficult to map either this modal expansion or the 'relaxation of the semantic restriction on the type of infinitive any further. The 'must'-*habeo* appears in free combination in 'Ulpian's gaudy stuff',[2] but he was a contemporary of Tertullian: he died in 228 A.D. In Frontinus (ob. 103) there is a peculiar example ambiguous between desire and necessity,[3] and in Velius Longus (? of the Hadrianic period) there is a case of the passive of the standard *habeo dicere* which does not differ in modality from the Augustan passages cited.[4] These sporadic cases are the only ones worth consideration, and it seems that the extension of this usage after the time of Christ was a decidedly vulgar affair, a development just about acceptable in humdrum *Fachliteratur*, but not in elegant prose, still less in poetry.[5]

Similarly, it is impossible to document further than we already have the process by which *habeo*+inf. used in contexts of ability with verbs of the semantic field 'give information', 'express one's emotions' came to be used (as

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[1] Thielmann put great weight on the example from Seneca Rhetor as the earliest example of the 'must'-*habeo*, but he made rather heavy weather of it, insisting that the idea of ability was irrelevant to its growth, and treating it as an entirely separate structure. There is this justification for separating the examples discussed from the others at the early period, that the distribution is different; but it is wrong to treat the locutions as separate in and after Tertullian, when there is no longer any distributional difference between different senses of the structure. It is as if one were to give rigidly separate diachronic accounts of the prehistorically distinct components of the subjunctive or perfect systems of Latin, insisting that the meanings of those separate components remained separate after a single formal system had established itself. I wonder whether the exclusive opposition in German of the sentence-types 'was kann/konnte ich tun?' and 'was soll/sollte ich tun?' has not been behind the generally rather unsatisfactory categorization of the material by German scholars.

[2] *D.* 48. 5. 16. 3 'neque enim laborare habet ut se repraesentet.'

[3] *Strat.* 1. 5. 1 'Q. Sertorius in Hispania cum a tergo instante hoste flumen traicere haberet' (*aueret* Hartel, Gundermann) 'uallum in ripa eius in modum cauae lunae duxit.' See further below, p. 394.

[4] *G.L.K.* 7. 49. 20 'ut iam in ambiguitatem cadat utrum per i quaedam habeant dici an per u'.

[5] At Statius *Th.* 6. 159 f. 'nec uos incessere luctu orba habeo' (*abeo* pars codd.) the correct reading is *aueo* (Muller, Ellis), and at Val. Flacc. 1. 671 f. 'tollique uicissim pontus habet', Schott's *auet* should be printed; cf. Hor. *C.* 4. 11. 7 for the inanimate subject and passive infinitive (cited below). We have already seen enough to know that these two alleged and in any case aberrant *habeo*-structures have as much right to a place in the grand style of Silver Epic as would a glottal stop in Milton; we shall presently see that they both use *aueo* elsewhere, and that it fits their manner; we may add that it makes sense, whereas commentators and lexicographers seem reluctant to explain exactly what *habeo* is supposed to mean in either context: 'can' or 'must' will hardly do.

it is in this sense in Tertullian) with any infinitive; the few examples which come from after the Augustan age are all from prose writers, and conform to the Ciceronian pattern (see above, p. 388 n. 4). There is one apparent exception. The learned Gellius, who elsewhere uses *habeo dicere* in the manner of Cicero, is represented in the manuscripts and editions as making the amusingly pedantic Ennius-expert in *N.A.* 20. 10. 2 say 'si quid quaerere habes, quaeras licet.' The objection to this is not simply that it is unique in the period between Christ and Tertullian, but that if it is Latin, it is the Latin of the contemporary gutter; which it is inappropriate to attribute either to Gellius or to the *persona* of the imaginary *grammaticus*. Whereas if we read *quaerere aues* we restore a pedantically correct Ciceronian usage of a word which had long since disappeared from spoken Latin. And it is now to this verb that we must turn our attention; for its classical usage and its 'disappearance' in the Augustan period is precisely that body of relevant evidence which has not been brought into the discussion and which may affect our assessment of the developments of the first two centuries A.D.[1]

III

The verb *aueo* disappeared from living speech in unusual and interesting circumstances to be defined further below about the time of Christ. Then it disappears entirely from literature. It turns up again in Lucan (4. 265 'inopes . . . cingere . . . Caesar auet'), and thereafter it appears as a classicizing ornament in elegant and fustian prose and in poetry, not always handled correctly according to its classical usage by its bookish resuscitators.

In the classical period the verb occurred in four structures only: (i) *aueo*+ neuter pronominal or clausal object;[2] (ii) in verse only, in the participle *auens*+any infinitive;[3] (iii) *animus* (*mens*) *auet*+any infinitive, a strong expression which tends to head the utterance as a whole;[4] (iv) *aueo audire*, where *audire*

[1] I take my material from Bickel's *T.L.L.* article on *aueo*. It is ungracious to carp at the shortcomings of the less well-organized articles in *T.L.L.*, for it is to bite the hand which feeds us. But it may fairly be said that Bickel's chronological arrangement of the material effectively obscures important facts about the usage of the verb, and that his statement 'uerbum est poetarum . . . ab ENNIO adsumpsisse uidetur CIC., a posterioribus poetis LIV.; notandum quod deest apud VERG., ergo rarum est apud inferiores' involves two plain and two tasteless errors of interpretation. Kiessling (on Horace *C.* 4. 11. 8) rightly allowed the verb a place in the Classical *sermo familiaris*.

[2] Lucr. 3. 957 'semper aues quod abest', 1082 f. 'dum abest quod auemus . . . aliud . . . auemus'; Hor. *S.* 1. 1. 94 'parto quod auebas'. Such later examples as Statius *Th.* 7. 11 'arma tubasque insatiatus auet (Mars)', Apul. *Fl.* p. 96 Oud. 'hereditatem auebant' do not correspond strictly to classical norms.

[3] Cic. *Arat.* 425 'auens epulas ornare'; Lucr. 3. 259 'rationem reddere auentem';

[4] 1204 'canes discedere auentes'; Hor. *S.* 2. 4. 1 'non est mihi tempus auenti ponere signa' (*ponere* 'in common'); 2. 6. 99 'urbis auentes moenia . . . subrepere'; Ovid *M.* 2. 503 'accedere auenti' (Ital.: *fugit* codd.). Much later in pretentious prose: e.g. Aurel. Vict. 39. 10 'imperium auens eripere' (right pattern), e. 1. 'Caligula auentibus cunctis deligitur' (false pattern).

[4] Varro *L.L.* 6. 83 'aures ab aueo, quod his auemus di⟨s⟩cere semper' (cf. Ciceronian usage, quoted below, p. 392 n. 1) 'quod Ennius uidetur etymon ostendere uelle in Alexandro' (*tr.* 47. 2) 'cum ait "iamdudum ab ludis animus atque aures auent auide exspectantes nuntium"'; id. *Men.* 78 'quibus instabilis animus ardens mutabiliter auet habere et non habere fastidiliter inconstanti pectore' (with a jingle? see below); Cat. 46. 7 'iam mens praetrepidans auet uagari'; Lucr. 2. 265 'non posse tamen prorumpere equorum uim cupidam tam desubito quam mens auet ipsa'; Cic. *Phil.* 5. 13 'auet animus apud consilium illo pro reo dicere.'

This last was perhaps the *locus classicus*; at

represents any verb from the semantic field 'receive information',[1] though there are already in Cicero one or two exceptions pointing in the direction of subsequent developments.[2] It is with this fourth structure, exactly parallel in form with *habeo dicere*, that we are concerned. Now it is really rather surprising that this semantic restriction should have existed at all; for it does not apply in the three other *aueo*-structures,[3] and does not apply to *aueo*+inf. in the generation after Cicero;[4] it enjoys a brief freedom, whereafter it abruptly disappears from any writing which might reasonably be said to reflect the *sermo familiaris*.[5] Then comes the gap, and then the learned revivals, first with no semantic restriction in Silver Epic,[6] then in more staid imitation of Cicero and Livy in refined and pretentious prose.[7]

any rate, everyone had the *Philippics* drummed into them at school, and in the following examples from the 'revival' period, the word-order has become fixed: Tac. *A.* 4. 71 'auebat animus anteire statimque memorare . . .'; Arnob. *Adv. Nat.* 5. 26 'auet animus scire quibus sitis eloquiis tam periculosa negotia defensuri uel artibus quibus habeatis tam confossis salutem dare personis' (our two structures combined, with a jingle? See above); Symmachus *ep.* 6. 67 'auet animus edoceri . . .'. Merob. *Pan. poet.* 107 'Aetium . . . procerum mens omnis auet' is a false pattern by Classical standards.

[1] Varro *L.L.* 6. 83 'auemus di⟨s⟩cere' (quoted more fully above, p. 391 n. 4); Cic. *Fin.* 2. 46 'quid . . . fiat scire auemus'; 4. 52 'auent audire cur malum non sit'; *Tusc.* 1. 16 'aueo tamen audire'; 1. 112 'aueo enim audire quidquid est'; *Tim.* 8 'si forte . . . minus id quod auemus, aliquid uidere, audire, addiscere'; *Arat.* 341 'si solis aues . . . cognoscere cursus'; *N.D.* 2. 2 'aueo audire . . . quid sentias.' While the expression is frequent in *Att.*, it strangely never occurs in *Fam.*: *Att.* 1. 15. 2 'ualde aueo scire quid agas'; 2. 18. 1 'intellexi quam suspenso animo et sollicito scire aueres quid esset noui'; 4. 3. 1 'auere te certo scio cum scire quid hic agatur tum ea a me scire'; 4. 15. 3 'auere te scribis accipere aliquid a me litterarum' (i.e., 'receive information'; this example suggests Atticus used the expression in the same way); 5. 20. 9 'quid actum sit aueo scire'; 6. 1. 19 'ea quae sint . . . aueo scire'; 7. 2. 7 'Hortensius quid egerit aueo scire'; 7. 3. 9 'nunc aueo scire quid hominis sit'; 13. 35. 2 'scire igitur aueo quomodo res se habeat'; 13. 39. 2 'set tamen scire aueo qualis ei totius itineris summa fuerit'; 13. 50. 3 'quantum acceperit prorsus aueo scire'; 14. 7. 1 'nam cum reliqua tum de hoc scire aueo omnia'; 15. 19. 2 'hoc enim uero nunc discere aueo.' The structure is, for Cicero at least, clearly colloquial.

[2] Cic. *Sen.* 83 'conuenire aueo quos ipse

cognoui' and Lucr. 3. 6 'te' (Epicurus) 'imitari aueo' are perhaps arguably tangential to the main type, but Cic. *Att.* 2. 18. 3 'non lubet fugere, aueo pugnare' and 14. 12. 2 'itaque exire aueo ''ubi nec Pelopidarum'', inquit' fall outside it. This is not surprising in view of the artificiality of the restriction of the use of the infinitive with personal *aueo* (its other infinitival structures being 'free') and in view of the subsequent developments.

[3] *habens*+inf., which would be parallel to *auens*+inf., does not appear before Tertullian.

[4] Hor. *S.* 1. 4. 87 'unus auet quauis aspergere cunctos'; Livy 33. 32. 8 'cum . . . uidere nuntium aueret', 45. 39. 8 'conspicere . . . ingredientem auent' (both these close to the older usage); *C.L.E.* 969 SEIQUIS HAUET NOSTRO (e.g. PROPRIUM) CONFERRE DOLORE, ADSIT NEC PARUEIS FLERE QUEAD LACHRYMIS (from this period on orthographic grounds, and note *flere queat = flere habet = flebit*).

[5] The latest example is the extraordinary 'ara . . . auet inmolato spargier' (cf. *S.* 1. 4. 87, quoted above) 'agno', Hor. *Carm.* 4. 11. 8, the first case of *aueo*+pass. inf., and of an inanimate subject, and the only case in Hor. *Carm.* of the archaic inf. in -*ier*. The whole passage is a most strange mixture of familiar and archaistic elements and I am at a loss to define the tone precisely; see Kiessling *ad loc.*

[6] Lucan 4. 265 'inopes . . . cingere . . . Caesar auet'; 7. 84 'scire senatus auet'; Val. Flacc. 1. 671 f. 'tollique uicissim pontus auet' (*habet* codd., as usual, but cf. Hor. *Carm.* 4. 11. 8); Silius Ital. 1. 61 (*abolere*), 5. 533 (*reponere*), 7. 22 (*cognoscere*), 14. 183 (*euellere*), 15. 373 (*portare*).

[7] Tacitus *A.* 12. 36 'auebant uisere' (as Livy: see above); Apul. *Plat.* 2. 16 'haurire auet omnia genera uoluptatis'; *Apol.* 94 'litteras ter et quater aueo . . . lectitare'; Julius Valerius, *Ps.-Callisthenes* 3. 32 'et ipse

IV

The reader is asked, if he has not already spotted the remarkable coincidence, to look again at the account above of the earliest use of *habeo*+inf. Of the two rhyming structures, the one is restricted to use with infinitives meaning 'express information' and the other to infinitives meaning 'receive information' in the Classical period, i.e., down to say 35 B.C. The structures are linked in limitation, and stand in complementary distribution, over the semantic field 'communication.'[1] This suggests that the structures *habeo dicere* and *aueo audire* were felt in some sense to constitute an opposed pair in the Classical period. This is also suggested by the overall distribution of the rhyming locutions. For if a Classical or Augustan author uses the one, he also uses the other; otherwise, he avoids both. Thus Cicero, Lucretius, Horace, and Ovid have both, while Plautus, Terence, Ennius, Sallust, Catullus, Virgil, Propertius, and Tibullus have neither. This is quite a high correlation,[2] and the question arises why some authors should implicitly link these expressions by avoiding them both, while others should use them both, subject at first to more or less strict and simple semantic restrictions linking them in diversity. This is clearest in Cicero, less so in Lucretius; in Horace the *habeo*-locution is still bound, but the *aueo*-locution is free; in Ovid, the *habeo*-structure too becomes freer, as we have seen. Then the *aueo*-structure abruptly disappears.

Consider what will have happened when (i) initial /h/ ceased to be stable[3] and (ii) /b/ and /w/ converged as a new phoneme /β/.[4] The two structures will no longer simply have rhymed: they will have been homophonous in all forms and contexts, and the only way in which a listener will have been able to interpret the lexeme /aβeo/ will have been from the context. Since *habeo*+inf. at this time was restricted to verbs meaning 'inform', it was a natural

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sane loqui per litteras aueo cum Candace'; 1. 7 'aueo enim scire'; Auson. 399. 18 'auemus agrum uisere', 178. 32 'cetera quae noscere aues'; Paul. Nol. *carm.* 24. 429, etc.

[1] Lucretius keeps within the 'communication' field, but does not observe the same demarcation: he, like Cicero, uses *habeo dicere* only for verbs meaning 'inform' (6. 711 'item in multis hoc rebus dicere habemus'), but allows *aueo*+inf. not only with a verb meaning 'be informed' (2. 216 'illud in his quoque te rebus cognoscere auemus') but also with a verb meaning 'inform' (4. 778 'plane si res exponere auemus'). It should be borne in mind in all this that we are describing a restriction which only applies to one of four species of *aueo*-structure.

[2] Varro has one *aueo audire* expression but no corresponding *habeo dicere* (see above), this in a pointed scholion; and he is a fragmentary author anyway. He (and Catullus and Ennius) use the *animus auet* structure; but that is irrelevant here, as it does not rhyme with a *habeo*-structure.

[3] In the mid-first century B.C.: cf. Catullus 84, Fordyce's comments *ad loc.*, Nigidius Figulus (first century B.C.) ap. Gell.

N.A. 13. 6. 3 'rusticus fit sermo si aspires perperam', and W. S. Allen, *Vox Latina*, 1965, 44.

[4] No absolute date can be given for either of the relevant shifts, as they developed, it seems, in different places in different social registers. Some places in Plautus might be taken to suggest that in some dialects they had already taken place (*Poen.* 313 *ĕsse et bibere* = *ĕsse et uiuere*?); and Varro's 'quibus instabilis animus ardens mutabiliter auet habere et non habere fastidiliter inconstanti pectore' (*Men.* 78; see above, p. 391 n. 4) looks like a paradoxical jingle exploiting the shifts. It was well established at Pompeii by the mid-first century A.D., as the frequent interchange of B and V in spelling shows. On the other hand a strong case can be made for supposing that the shifts never happened in British Latin: it would not be relevant to present the evidence here. Again, Consentius (fifth century A.D.) implies that he himself used /w/ in a word like *ueni* (*G.L.K.* 5. 395). I cannot agree with Allen's view (*Vox Latina*, 1965, 42) that there is no evidence at all for /β/ before the first century A.D.

consequence that *aueo*+inf., now phonetically indistinguishable, should suffer a parallel semantic restriction, while *aueo* in its other structures should continue to be free in this respect. This was not a satisfactory or stable situation: some writers solved the difficulty by avoiding both locutions, while Cicero for one sought further (no doubt subconsciously) to maintain the opposition of the two verbs by means of a semantic demarcation using *habeo* with infinitives meaning 'inform' and limiting *aueo* in this structure to verbs meaning 'be informed'. This does not imply that Cicero or the writers who avoid the locutions themselves dropped their *h*'s and used the phoneme $/\beta/$: it only means that they heard other people doing so, and were thus indirectly influenced by what they would no doubt have regarded as vulgarity. These attempts to maintain the identity of the verb *aueo* broke down, and the verb disappears at the time of Christ.

But it would be wrong to suppose that it disappeared without a trace. The meaning of a lexeme depends not on its supposedly inherent 'meaning' or on its spelling, but on the contexts in which it is used in speech. Suppose that you are a child in the time of Augustus, which seems to be the crucial period. Your father, or your teacher, reads you some Lucretius. He has the modern habit of dropping initial $/h/$ and using $/\beta/$. The linguistic structure at 6. 711 'item in multis hoc rebus dicere habemus' will strike you as in no way different from that used at 4. 778 'plane si res exponere auemus', and if yours is a cheap copy, the spelling of the latter will quite possibly be *habemus*. Nevertheless you will correctly infer from the contexts that the lexeme in the one means 'can', in the other 'want'. This will not be at all surprising: your elders, as you have often discovered, use *aβeo* in just these ways in ordinary speech. You will naturally copy their usage; and thus, without ever having identified a word *aueo* as a separate entity, you will have established what you pronounce as *aβeo* and write as *habeo* as an exponent of desire as well as of potentiality, at the same time as this locution is beginning to be used, as we have seen, in contexts of deliberation which at least in part contribute to the establishment of a 'must'-*habeo*.

Thus the situation arises in the first century A.D. in vulgar speech that the lexeme *aβeo* when combined with an infinitive covers a semantic field which may be thought of as an equilateral triangle at the corners of which stand the three modal ideas 'can', 'must', and 'want'. The element shared by these ideas is 'prospect', and that is the semantic area of the triangle. At the dead centre of the triangle the three forces are in equilibrium; they neutralize each other; we are left with the idea of pure prospect—that is, for *aβeo*, *aβes*, etc., the idea of simple futurity, and for *aβeβam*, *aβeβas*, etc., futurity-in-the-past and conditioned unreality. Moreover, since what we want to do is not necessarily different from what we can do or must do or are going to do, the area between the centre of our triangle and its corners is occupied by irresoluble mixtures of modalities. Thus in the passage of Frontinus cited above (p. 390 n. 3) 'traicere haberet' involves both Desire and Necessity; it is wrong to emphasize one against the other, and the conjecture *aueret* is inappropriate because, as we have seen, the revival of this word in Lucan and subsequent writers is a learned archaism having nothing to do with the spoken language and at home only in grandiloquent circumstances.

V

This view, if right, will make it less remarkable than it has seemed up to now that all the post-classical functions of *habeo*+infinitive should suddenly appear in Tertullian; if wrong, we have at least given an account of the verb *aueo* and demonstrated the relationship in the Classical period of *aueo*+inf. and *habeo*+ inf. Three points arising from Mr. Coleman's paper remain to be discussed in relation to this suggestion.

(i) Mr. Coleman seems very loath to admit, but cannot deny, the existence of a volitional *habeo*+inf. structure (p. 219 n. 2). He quotes Past. Herm. *Sim.* 9. 9 'quid . . . non eligis siquos habes eligere' as 'one of the very few plausible examples', with its Greek version τί . . . οὐκ ἐκλέγῃ . . . οὓς θέλεις. An important principle of interpretation incidentally arises. One often finds that scholars will quote the Greek original in connection with a passage of Latin translation-literature in order to clarify the meaning of the latter. This should be done with less assurance and more caution than it is. For when (as here) the Latin version is not absolutely *ad verbum*, it is an assumption that the translator even intended to turn the Greek word in question with an exact Latin equivalent. More importantly, it is irrelevant to adduce the Greek, for, whatever the translator intended, his Latin reader or auditor will interpret what is said in its Latin context, without reference to the Greek original; for him as for us, this example is irresolubly ambiguous between futurity, volition, and potentiality. But the volitional component is surely there. It is a serious fault that the categories set up by Bulhart in his *T.L.L.* article on *habeo* are exclusive, and do not allow for prospective uses which partake simultaneously of two or all of the polar modalities.[1] If, therefore, we ask for clear polar examples of a volitional *habeo*, we may be asking for the wrong thing. If I am right in setting up a triangular semantic field of 'prospect' with futurity at its dead centre and obligation, desire, and ability at its corners for the immediately pre-Tertullian period, we ought to find not necessarily exclusively volitional examples of *habeo* in Tertullian and later writers, but certainly we should find some prominently volitional examples. This implies a thorough re-examination of all the material in and after Tertullian. This would go beyond the scope of this paper, but would, I suspect, produce more than the two-dozen odd passages cited by Bulhart in this connection. I shall confine myself to citing three of those he mentions:

Tert. *resurr.* 52 p. 107. 21 Kroymann '. . . Deus autem dat illi' (sc., nudo grano) 'corpus prout uult' (I Cor. 15. 38). 'certe ei grano, quod nudum seminari ait, certe inquis. ergo saluum est cui dare habet' ('wants-to-and-is-going-to') 'Deus corpus'. It seems altogether artificial to exclude volition here, since Tertullian glosses the *prout uult* of the quoted scripture with *habet*+ inf.

Itin. Ant. Plac. 8 (rec. A): the pilgrims in this extraordinary account are execrated by the Samaritans, through whose settlements they must pass. They are charged tolls by the Samaritans 'ea sane ratione ut quod habis' (sic) 'emere non tangas antequam pretium des; quod si tetigeris, mox scandalum'. The author of the somewhat more 'correct' rec. B took the modality to be exclusively volitional (*uis* for *habis*), and I must say I agree with him.

[1] In my opinion, only a minority of the material from Tertullian and later writers classified by Bulhart as potential, obligatory, and future is rightly presented under these exclusive heads.

Vitaepatrum 3. 7 Migne: Abbot Zeno was on a pilgrimage in the Holy Land; he was tired by the heat, and sat down in the shade of a tree to rest. There was a field of cucumbers nearby. The abbot 'cogitat . . . in corde suo ut surgeret et tolleret sibi ad refectionem de ipsis cucumeribus. "nihil enim" inquit "grande est quod habeo tollere."' In fact he resists this earthly desire and this seems to me to be ambiguous between futurity and volition.

(ii) Mr. Coleman follows Thielmann in deriving the future sense of the *habeo*+inf. structure solely from the 'must'-*habeo*. But although this has become standard doctrine in handbooks on the Romance languages, it was in fact the weakest thing in Thielmann's treatment, depending on *petitio principii* and rendered superficially plausible partly by the conceptual error of treating the 'can' and 'must' senses of *habeo*+inf. as separate linguistic structures in and after Tertullian, when in fact there was no formal or distributional difference between examples of the structure of either sense; and partly by the rhetorical device of presenting this material in a rigidly diachronic manner, first for 'can' and then for 'must'. Mr. Coleman's reasons for accepting this, and dismissing the 'can'-*habeo* as irrelevant, are poor: there is, he says, no analogy for the development of a future lexeme from an exponent of potentiality;[1] whereas there is for the development of a future lexeme from an exponent of obligation/necessity—the 'shall'-lexeme of Germanic. The first point does not merit attention, the second is false. The subject is of some complexity, but it may be stated that the *shall* of English has only come to be an atonic exponent of futurity because of the equal and opposite tension of the *will*: the tonic forms are still opposed ('I *will* do it'; 'thou shalt not kill') and indeed inverted ('You *will* do it'; 'I *shall* go') by back formation from the universalized reduced form '*ll*. This stands in major opposition to '*ld*; both forms are usually accounted for as phonetic attrition of the atonic *will* and *would* subsequently generalized through the paradigms. It would perhaps be more economical to say that these opposed forms have been recognized as bearing the major functional load in that they differentiate the future from the conditional and that, being common to *shall/should* and *will/would* in their atonic forms, they have been extrapolated equally from each.[2] The essential point, however, is that the analogy supports not Coleman's view, but the view that an exponent of obligation will need an exponent of desire to neutralize it; and that we may find in *aueo*'s contribution to our structure.

(iii) Mr. Coleman's most important suggestion is that the crucial context of the semantic expansion of *habeo*+inf. to include futurity was in the past passive: to say of someone 'he had to be killed', *habebat occidi*, is close to saying 'he was going to be killed.' By analogy, the present species came to be used in prospective contexts where modality was irrelevant: *habet occidi/occidere*, 'he'll

[1] In fact, the atonic *can* [kn] is often so used in colloquial English, and in late Latin *posse* was a contender as an exponent of futurity.

[2] The 'rules' for the use of *shall* and *will* are artificial and defective in many points, but in none more than the failure of grammarians to distinguish tonic and atonic forms. Even today, Dr. Syntax objects to the use of '*ll* in the first person on the unnecessary view that this must represent *will*:

F. T. Wood, *Current English Usage*, 1962, 264 writes, 'the abbreviation '*ll* should be used only for *will*. *Shall* should be written and spoken in full. Sentences like 'I'll be twenty-one next August' are often heard in speech, but they are better avoided, and should not appear in writing.' But they have been with us for a long while, cf. e.g. Shakespeare *Much Ado* iii. iv. 8 *Ile weare this*. For examples, and an unsatisfactory statement of the rules, see *N.E.D.* s.vv. *shall, will, 'll, 'ld*.

(be) kill(ed).' These forms were particularly useful in those areas of the traditional synthetic system that were weak (future active, a victim of phonetic decay) or defective (future passive in the past, 'he was going to be . . .'). The absence of a simple exponent of the latter in older Latin became progressively more serious as the syntax of subordination became more analytic.

This is an elegant and economical explanation, particularly in that it would explain why the structure is most frequently encountered in Tertullian in its past passive species—it filled an area of the verbal system for which the traditional system had no simple exponent. This is in no way incompatible with the view that has been expressed in this paper on the semantic development before Tertullian. Less weight, however, should be given to phonetic attrition of the future simple than Coleman, repeating a common view, allows;[1] and we may suspect his specific formulation of the development of the future sense. For, in the first place, we have shown that the circumstances for the natural development of the future sense, the resolution of 'can', 'shall', and 'will', were already present in Tertullian's time, and that therefore to derive the future from one sense alone is unnecessary and does not take account of all the relevant evidence. In the second place, the examples which Coleman can quote are somewhat unrepresentative of reality. For a disproportionately large element of the material in and after Tertullian consists of assertions by Christians that an event was the fulfilment of part of the Divine dispensation, or will take place because it is foreordained in the Scriptures.[2] The universe is treated, if it may be said without impiety, like a vast railway-station; God has made up the time-table. The train from York was to arrive at 9.00, and so it did; the Bristol train is to arrive at 15.00, and it will. In such a world-view, cosmic prescription and description are close and can be confused. But neither Calvinist nor Marxist nor behaviourist actually and habitually relates the humdrum details of his own future to such a grand scheme, unless he is mad. It is enough to refer the large number of these examples in our material to the special subject-matter. We should not regard them as reflecting a development of popular speech, still less as initiating it. But I teeter on a philosophical cliff, and draw back: I conclude with a brief summary of my argument.

I began (I) by pointing out that not all the evidence relevant to an explanation of the future-forms of Romance has been taken into account; so existing accounts will be partial; the main discontinuity is in relating the usage of Tertullian to previous usage. The use of *habeo*+inf. (II) before Tertullian is examined, with particular reference to the semantic field of the infinitive, and (III) the same is done for *aueo*+inf. The latter is seen to have disappeared from

[1] The collapse of -ụ- and -b- as -β- will have been less damaging than might at first appear to the distinction of the future and perfect systems. For it will only have affected the first person plural (*laudabimus/lauda-uimus*), and then only in verbs with potentially identical stems (not therefore *monebimus/ monuimus*). All other persons of the perfect will have had distinct forms by the loss of intervocalic -ụ- at a much earlier stage: *laudai, laudasti, laudắt (-áut, -áit)*; It. *lodò*, Fr. *aima*, etc.), *laudastis, laudarunt*. Forms like *laudauimus* had never been regularly contracted, precisely because the result would be

homophonous with the present (*laudamus*). The only certain exceptions come in one book of one poet (Prop. 2. 7. 2 *flemus*, 2. 15. 3 *narramus*, 2. 15. 9 *multamus*). There was never any objection to the contraction of forms which would remain distinct (Enn. *tr.* 160 *nomus*, Lucr. 1. 60 *suemus*, etc.). See F. Sommer, *Laut- und Formenlehre*[2], 1914, 564, who does not, however, make clear the permissible circumstances of contraction.

[2] Tert. *adv. Iud.* 8 'quod esset uenturus et pati haberet' and Aug. *serm.* 40. 1 'aliquando Christiani non erunt et idola rursus coli habent' are typical.

speech about the time of Christ; it is later revived in Silver and subsequent learned and quasi-learned literature, irrelevant to our inquiry. A comparison (IV) of the Classical and Augustan uses of these locutions is made. Two facts suggest their subconscious pairing: writers use either both or neither locution, and in Cicero at least they are used in complementary distribution, 'I can inform'/'I wish to be informed'. This breaks down in the Augustan period; both locutions are used more freely. An explanation is called for. It is suggested that homophony is behind the pairing of the locutions, the brief freedom of the Augustan period, and the disappearance of *aueo*. The crucial point of the argument is that *aueo* did not disappear without a trace; it modified the semantic field of the *habeo*-locution, which now could be heard in contexts of volition. Thus by the first century A.D., *aβeo*+inf. could be used in contexts of ability, volition, and obligation, thus establishing the conditions necessary for its use as an exponent of simple futurity. This would link up (V) with the usage of Tertullian and others more easily: they were the first to make extensive use in writing of what had previously been regarded (since the time of Christ) as vulgarity. English *shall, will, 'll* provides a partial parallel. Mr. Coleman's explanation is not incompatible with this view, but it might be thought superfluous, and in any case there is no reason to exclude the 'can' and 'will' *habeo* from an account of the Romance future.

If this is right, the origins of the Romance future system are to be traced back to developments in the vulgar speech of the time of Christ, that is, a good deal further back than has been supposed. But there is nothing improbable in this: the obsolescence, for example, of the neuter gender goes back even further.[1]

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THE late Eduard Fraenkel, part of whose *Nachlass* appears in this number of the *Classical Quarterly* (pp. 214–228), left a considerable bulk of papers. These have been deposited in the library of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, as a gift from his family, and a handlist that has now been compiled shows their range and interest. They include notes on lectures by (amongst other famous names) Wilamowitz, Lehmann, Schulze, Wackernagel, Dessau, and especially Leo; the manuscripts of a number of Fraenkel's books, articles, and student essays, together with notes for his own lecture courses; and miscellaneous correspondence. Anyone interested to have access to the papers should make arrangements direct with the Librarian of the college, who can also supply copies of the handlist.